Autonomous Vehicle: Security by Design by Chattopadhyay, Anupam & Lam, Kwok-Yan
Autonomous Vehicle: Security by Design
Anupam Chattopadhyay and Kwok-Yan Lam†
School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
{anupam, kwokyan.lam}@ntu.edu.sg
Abstract—Security of (semi)-autonomous vehicles is a growing
concern, first, due to the increased exposure of the functionality
to the potential attackers; second, due to the reliance of car
functionalities on diverse (semi)-autonomous systems; third, due
to the interaction of a single vehicle with myriads of other
smart systems in an urban traffic infrastructure. Beyond these
technical issues, we argue that the security-by-design principle for
smart and complex autonomous systems, such as an Autonomous
Vehicle (AV) is poorly understood and rarely practiced. Unlike
traditional IT systems, where the risk mitigation techniques and
adversarial models are well studied and developed with security
design principles such as security perimeter and defence-in-
depth, the lack of such a framework for connected autonomous
systems is plagueing the design and implementation of a secure
AV. We attempt to identify the core issues of securing an AV.
This is done methodically by developing a security-by-design
framework for AV from the first principle. Subsequently, the
technical challenges for AV security are identified.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern cars are fitted with a range of autonomy features.
In order to distinguish such cars with varying degrees of au-
tonomy in a consistent manner, SAE International (the Society
of Automative Engineers) proposed 6 levels of autonomy in
the standard J3016 [1]. There, Level 0 means no automation
and Level 5 is full automation. From Levels 0 − 2, a human
driver monitors the driving environment, whereas from Levels
3−5, the driving system monitors the driving environment. A
tabular description of the capabilities associated with different
levels of autonomy is provided in Table I.
Level Automation Steering Environment Fallback DrivingCruise Monitoring Control Modes
0 None H H H N/A
1 Supportive H,S H H Some
2 Partial S H H Some
3 Conditional S S H Some
4 High S S H Some
5 Full S S S All
TABLE I
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: LEVELS OF AUTONOMY (S - SYSTEM, H -
HUMAN)
Understandably, with higher degree of autonomy, the se-
curity risks are also escalated. From Level 3 onwards, it
becomes necessary that the car is fitted with an increased
number of sensing and communicating devices in order to be
”self-aware”. In the following discussions, unless specifically
†Corresponding author.
mentioned, we define Autonomous Vehicles (AV) as modern
vehicles with autonomy features at Level 3 and above as
specified in Table I.
Related Literature
A connected AV is subjected to cyber attacks through its
various network interfaces to the public network infrastructure
as well as its direct exposure to the open physical environment.
An attack surface of a system is the sum of the different
attack vectors, that is the different points where attackers
can make attempts to inject data to or extract data from the
system in order to compromise the security control of the AV.
Figure 1 depicts the typical attack surfaces of an AV, such
as the ones identified by the authors in [10], and potential
attack sources through which AV security can be threatened.
It can be observed that the attack sources are typically external
agent/event or even an internal component with malicious
intent that attempts to compromise the expected autonomy
functionality of the AV. For example, the Bluetooth interface of
the AV shown in Figure 1 can be considered a potential attack
surface that can be compromised through plugging malicious
devices (attack source) into this communication channel.
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Fig. 1. Potential Attack Sources and Surfaces in Cars [10]
There has been a significant body of work on the per-
ceived threats, and the related countermeasures, of AV secu-
rity [27][37][16]. In this article, we argue that these threats
can be categorized according to the generic attack models of
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), i.e., originating from the attack
surface of an exposed CPS component. In the next section, we
briefly review the security issues of CPS as well as the security
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of AV as a specific kind of CPS; and particularly emphasise
on attacks that have been demonstrated in practical setting.
II. SECURITY ISSUES OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
In this section, we first review the security issues of CPS be-
fore pinpointing to the key considerations and new challenges
that are specific to AV security.
A. CPS Security
An autonomous vehicle can be considered a specific type
of Cyber-Physical System (CPS) and also a kind of Internet-
of-Things (IoT) system. Cyber-Physical-Systems are complex,
heterogeneous distributed systems, typically consisting of a
large number of sensors and actuators connected to a pool
of computing nodes. With the fusion of sensors, computing
nodes, and actuators, which are connected through various
means of communications, CPS aim to perceive and under-
stand changes in the physical environment, analyze the impacts
of such changes to the operation of the CPS, and make intelli-
gent decisions to respond to the changes by issuing commands
to control physical objects in the system; thereby influencing
the physical environment in an autonomous way [31]. As illus-
trated in Fig. 2, the connections between actuation and sensing
through the physical environment, and between sensors and
actuators through one or multiple (distributed) computing or
intelligent control node(s), form a feedback loop which aims at
achieving a desired objective or steady state. As such, a CPS
acts either with full autonomy or at least provides support
for a human-in-the-loop mechanism as part of some semi-
autonomous control functions. This distributed closed-loop
process allows CPS to remotely influence, manage, automate
and control many industrial operations.
Sensing Layer Actuation Layer
Intelligent Control and Communication
internet
Fig. 2. Interactions between sensor layer and actuator layer
Due to the operational nature of CPS in most industrial con-
trol processes, CPS are also known as Operational Technology
Systems (OT Systems) [14][26].
The massive adoption of Internet-enabled devices (i.e., IP-
enabled sensors and actuators) in CPS systems has thereby
blurred the boundary between CPS and Internet-of-Things
(IoT). The concept of IoT stems from connected smart de-
vices [36], which may or may not be interacting with physical
objects. Hence, there are application scenarios in the classical
OT domain that can be conveniently classified both as an IoT
system and a CPS system, e.g. distributed set of sensor nodes
to monitor and control the energy usage of a manufacturing
plant. Prominent examples of CPS and IoT systems, and
their corresponding applications [24] include, among others,
autonomous vehicles, which is the focus of this work.
As such, attack techniques against a diversity of OT systems
have similarities and can be classified as attacks on different
CPS components, e.g., communication, storage, actuator, sen-
sor and computing nodes. A few such attacks are shown in
the Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. CPS Attacks: Generic Model
However, this naı¨ve and isolated analysis of attacks, in the
context of a specific CPS, and the adoption of the correspond-
ing countermeasures, are grossly inadequate and misleading
for several reasons.
• These generic attack studies tend to ignore the security
objectives of the CPS, which aim to strike a balance be-
tween risks, cost and convenience through the adoption of
a hybrid of security control measures. Thus, a seemingly
insecure mechanism may be operationally acceptable
due to the fact that it is operating within a controlled
environment created by other security mechanisms of the
system.
• Depending on the prevailing OT security practices, as
well as the assumed adversarial model, it might be
unnecessary to account for certain vulnerabilities.
• The generalization of attacks across all CPS typically
ignores the roles of Roots of Trust (RoT) and security
perimeter modeling, which are the basis of many security-
by-design approaches.
In principle, security-by-design of a CPS is a holistic pro-
cess which is viewed as a systems engineering discipline [2].
Addressing specific attacks in an isolated and ad-hoc manner
cannot help much in security design practices. For these
reasons, this paper refers to the above classification and
enumeration of attacks, as done predominantly in the current
literature, as generic attack studies in that they tend to study
localized attacks in a generic setting of CPS. This trend of
generic attack studies is exacerbated by the fact that there is
no well-defined security standard that aligns with the road-
safety standards for the AV.
In contrast, we emphasise on the security-by-design of AV
as a system, indeed a cyber-physical system. In the context
of the specific vulnerabilities of AV with different degrees of
autonomy, the technological challenges to safeguard AV are
derived directly from the underlying safety objectives.
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Fig. 4. Exemplary Networked Vehicle
B. AV Security Issues
The networking capabilities of a typical AV is depicted in
Fig. 4. The car is connected to the outside world with vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) commu-
nication links. The V2I and V2V links provide the AV with, for
example, traffic-status information from traffic management
infrastructure or navigation-related information received from
other AVs on the road. These connection interfaces represent
attack surfaces that the adversaries will aim to exploit in
order to obtain unauthorized access to the AV. Thus, it is of
paramount importance that these V2I and V2V connections
are mutually authenticated and the payload suitably protected
from unauthorized disclosure and unauthorized modification.
On the other hand, the internal of an AV is installed with a
multitude of independent and overlapping CPS systems, such
as adaptive cruise control, anti-lock braking system, assistive
parking system. Depending on the level of autonomy, more
functionalities are helmed by the internal CPS controllers, with
varying degree of human intervention. These CPS systems
are supported by actuators and sensors, such as tyre pressure
sensor, crankshaft position sensor, light sensor and obstacle
sensors. Today, intra-vehicle communications for supporting
such CPS controls happen mostly through wired connections
known as the Control Area Network (CAN). The intra-vehicle
communication protocols typically follow the CAN bus stan-
dard or the more recent FlexRay standard.
The security design of AV requires that intra-vehicle net-
works [35][19] are rigourously protected and that access from
outside of the vehicle, if applicable (e.g. for maintenance and
services of the AV), be strictly controlled. It is evident from
previous generic attack studies of AV security that, without
proper security designs, even communications through these
intra-vehicle wireline standards are potentially susceptible to
security breaches [16][29]. Specific studies of the intra-vehicle
network security has been undertaken in [37], which is,
however, decoupled from the holistic view of the security-
by-design principles.
In addition, connections to the internet enable the AV to
transmit operational data to the car manufacturer. As a critical
system from the perspective of autonomy functions, it is
crucial that the communication link between the AV and its
manufacturer be authenticated and the payload be appropri-
ately protected in accordance with the nature of the operational
data being transmitted from the AV to the manufacturer.
III. SECURITY-BY-DESIGN
Security designs of business or industrial systems always
start from the security objectives of the systems which have
to take into consideration the management and people aspects
of the systems [3]. Indeed, in real world situations, security
requirements/objectives always start from people e.g. defining
business objectives of a system by the business owner, making
risk-taking decisions is part and parcel of any business venture.
Security is meaningful only when people understands what
is at stake. In this connection, the consideration is not only
in terms of the cost of security attacks but also the cost of
implementing security controls as well as the opportunity cost
of limiting business operations due to risk-averse designs. As
such, system security is modeled as a socio-technical system
in which technical design decisions are heavily influenced by
people’s factors.
In the context of AV, the prime security objective is in-
evitably the resilience of safety features of the autonomy func-
tions. As human lives are at stake, it is of utmost importance
that safety of AV are not compromised in face of attacks on
the automony functions. Ultimately, AV demands the highest
level of security measures to guard against attacks of safety-
related features. This is especially so for CPS responsible for
collision detection, cruise control and anti-lock braking etc.,
because any compromise of such features is likely to result in
injuries and even loss of life.
When studying the cybersecurity of socio-technical systems,
it is useful to identify the steps and processes where people are
involved in the security consideration of the system life-cycle.
The people/social/environment factors are typically some of
the major sources of vulnerabilities, which vary from system
to system. A more detailed discussion on socio-technical issues
related to security is available at [8][9].
A general overview of the security management framework
for a socio-technical system is presented in Fig. 5. In this
paper, we discuss the security-by-design of AV as a CPS, and
in a holistic manner, by identifying and addressing the security
objectives within this socio-technical framework. In the next
subsection, important concepts that form the basis of security
design of AV systems are reviewed.
A. Tenets of Security
When designing security for complex systems, it typically
involves the following key steps: (1) identify the security
Fig. 5. Layers of Security Management
objectives and requirements of the system; (2) assess the
value and sensitivity of the system to be protected; (3) define
security policy in accordance with the security requirements;
(4) estimate the capabilities of the adversaries; (5) design
control features that commensurate with the sensitivity of the
system and the risks it is exposed to.
Traditionally, standard security policies are guided by the
generic Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (also known
as the CIA triad) requirements at the message/data level.
These policies are reinforced with application-specific security
requirements and are eventually implemented with a com-
bination of physical and logical control measures including
cryptographic primitives and security protocols.
An alternative approach towards security design is to model
the potential threats at a system level. For example, Microsoft
proposed a threat classification model based on the following
six categories, also termed as the STRIDE threat model [4].
• Spoofing of user identity.
• Tampering of stored or communicated data.
• Repudiation, i.e., denying of actions performed where
other users cannot prove otherwise.
• Information disclosure or breach of confidentiality.
• Denial of Service (DoS) which makes a network/server
unavailable.
• Elevation of privilege for an user to perform unauthorized
actions.
In modern CPS and IoT systems, this threat model is
discussed together with the notion of attack surfaces. As
explained before, an attack surface provides an entry point for
an attacker to gain control of or exfiltrate information from the
target system. A detailed study of automotive attack surfaces
is presented in [16].
B. Adversarial Model
Once the attack surfaces of a system are identified, security
designers will need to estimate the likelihood that attacks may
happen in real and operational situations. This will mainly
depend on (1) the capabilities of the adversaries as well as (2)
their interests in investing resources to perform the attacks.
The former is typically analyzed by means of some adversarial
models while the latter depends on the value and sensitivity
of the system to both the system owner and the attacker.
Adversarial model is a formal definition of the attackers’
capabilities. Dolev and Yao defined the adversarial model
in [18] for proving the properties in an interacting crypto-
graphic system. The adversary, in this model, is capable of
hearing, intercepting, initiating and synthesizing any message.
However, such a strong adversarial model is considered
unrealistic; instead practical adversarial models, validated by
practical experiments, are used often. Adversarial models have
also been used later for network security, e.g., for the security
analysis of Onion Ring Routing, which permitted traffic-
analysis-resistant and anonymous Internet connections [32].
Adversarial models can also be used for analyzing privacy
guarantees, e.g., as has been done in [22], which defined an
adversary capable of intercepting the messages and identifying
the location of the context-aware system.
In the following, we define different parameters and possible
adversarial models for analyzing CPS security. Since the
adversarial model is closely tied to the application domain,
we use AV as a representative scenario here.
First, the attack objective. For a given CPS, the attacker
attempts to breach one or more of the security objectives. For
example, integrity breaches of an AV would mean that the
attacker is potentially able to take over control of the vehicle.
As another example, by being able to control communicatons
between the AV and any third-party system, the attacker is
capable of violating the confidentiality and integrity of the
communication channel, hence can potentially manipulate the
safety related control functions of the AV.
Second, the communication capability. Adversarial model is
mainly defined by the overall communication capability of the
attackers, e.g., to intercept messages transmitted over different
communication channels of a CPS, which determines what
kind of messages are available to them for analysis and their
ability to inject maliciously fabricated messages to the system.
In the context of an AV, this could be commands sent through
the internal CAN bus of the vehicle, or could be messages
transmitted as part of some V2X communication.
Third, the computing capability of the adversaries. Even
after gaining access to the CPS, through breaching the trusted
network, the adversary needs to execute tasks to gain control
or damage the CPS. These typically require cryptanalysis of
cryptograms, decoding of application protocol messages and
reverse-engineering security-critical parameters. The attackers
will need to carry out these tasks online or offline in an effi-
cient manner, often requiring considerable computing power.
In the context of AV security, there is no well-defined
adversarial model, hence making the work of a security
designer harder. Some recent works in the open literature
defined adversarial deep learning [11] that can undermine the
autonomous driving controls. However, this is not the kind
of adversarial model for analyzing security of the overall AV
operations, and is outside the scope of this discussion.
C. Trust Model and Security
As mentioned, security objectives are typically fulfilled
by cryptography-enabled control mechanisms which aim to
achieve confidentiality, integrity and authenticity, at least, at
the data and message level. This leads to the requirement
for key management, which in turn are based on some Trust
Model. For example, a Trusted Third Party (TPP) played by
an Authentication Server for symmetric key systems or a
Certification Authority of public key systems. Similarly, the
use of Web of Trust as in the case of PGP, or Distributed
Trust adopted by Blockchain, are examples of Trust Models.
In the latter, due to the absence of a TPP, one may adhere to
the use of consensus protocols and decision mechanisms like
the de-centralized trust model of Blockchain.
Trust Model is fundamental to all practical security designs
because it lays the security foundation of who one can trust,
which in turn allows users to determine what can be trusted. A
good security design always starts from a realistic and practical
trust model, with other cryptographic mechanisms and security
protocols being established and proven on the basis of the trust
model.
To illustrate, if the security of a CPS is dependent on
information/instruction received from another party, whose
trustworthiness is dubious, then the security of the CPS is ill-
based. Unfortunately, from experiences, this kind of situation
happened very often in practice, most likely, due to the retro-
fitting approach to security of a lot of existing CPS. For ex-
ample, a lot of sensitive online transactions have been hacked
because the underlying key management mechanisms, which
are assumed to be trusted, could be based on unverified open
source codes wherein security loopholes are commonplaces. If
the approach of security-by-design is adopted, the underlying
trust model will need to be explicitly defined and the basis of
such trust will have to be verified and assured.
D. Trust Infrastructure and Security Mechanisms
In the security design of AV, the communication connec-
tivity infrastructure is of prime importance; besides, it is
imperative to support security administration of trustworthy
IoT devices such as key, identity and privilege managements
of these devices. In a startling difference from wired networks,
for wireless and mobile ad-hoc networks, it often admits new
members, and therefore needs to frequently establish secure
communication channels. In the following, the distinguishing
features of a secure and trustworthy network management
infrastructure are presented:
• Infrastructure for trust management: A prime use case
scenario for IoT devices are ad-hoc sensor networks,
which find applications in V2V and V2I communica-
tions, for example. In such networks, control mecha-
nisms for admitting new nodes and detecting malicious
nodes [15] are important prerequisites for maintaining
security policies intact. There have been ample studies
on the key management protocols for wireless sensor
networks, e.g., via key pre-distribution [13], identity-
based encryption [17][38], certification authorities and
key exchange protocols. In general, these studies fall
under the general theme of trust management [12], which
is particularly challenging for low-end devices due to
the performance overhead that a secure key storage or
dynamic code attestation incurs.
• Secure routing protocol: IoT systems rely critically on
static/dynamic routing protocols, which may be subjected
to diverse forms of attacks [23]. Typical countermeasures
for routing protocol attacks depend on, firstly, a trusted
base station that enables authentication and encryption;
secondly, multipath routing and, thirdly, secure geo-
graphic routing protocols [20].
• Heterogeneous network integration: IoT networks are
usually associated with a heterogeneous mix of wireless
communication systems, each of which comes with its
own security protocols [14]. Their interoperability may
require conversion of data formats, which is difficult
to undertake without partial knowledge of the message
payload. Furthermore, the possible presence of, and of-
ten undetected, diverse information channels remains a
constant threat [21] that needs to be addressed by secure
and trustworthy network management means.
• Secured Resources: The computing and storage blocks of
a CPS can be considered secured, e.g., as in a Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE). The resources under this
category need to be assured by only accepting authen-
ticated and signed boot process. Secure storages can be
designed by preventing known attacks like, data rema-
nence; and further opting for encrypted and authenticated
data storage.
• Trusted Identification: For a CPS resource to be included
in the trusted network, it must participate in a robust
identification protocol, or be certified by a centralized
certification authority. This works in similar principles as
in wireless sensor networks, where trust management [12]
becomes challenging for low-end devices. For such a
resource, trust anchoring can be done using Physically
Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Typical adversarial models
against these are hardware Trojan elements, introduced in
the manufacturing/repairing process.
IV. SECURITY-BY-DESIGN FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
In this section, we describe the security assumptions, re-
quirements, threats and control measures of AV by adopting
the security-by-design approach. Specifically, we describe the
key steps of security-by-design in the context of AV by
viewing it as a socio-technical system. As explained, when
designing security for complex systems such as the AV, it
typically involves the following key steps: (1) identify the se-
curity objectives and requirements of the system; (2) assess the
value and sensitivity of the system to be protected; (3) define
security policy in accordance with the security requirements;
(4) estimate the capabilities of the adversaries; (5) design
control features that commensurate with the sensitivity of the
system and the risks it is exposed to.
In order to commence the security-by-design process within
a sound framework, it is important to establish the operation
model of the AV so that security objectives and requirements
may be analyzed in a holistic and systematic manner.
A. AV Operation Model
For simplicity, the following basic operation model of an
AV is assumed.
• Communication: AV periodically sends operation logs to
the manufacturer to allow life cycle management and
maintenance.
• Communication: AV has wireless or wired interfaces to
support firmware/software update/upgrade at maintenance
and service workshop.
• Communication: AV supports communication with some
traffic management system infrastructure for traffic flow
control as well as remote control in case of emergency.
• Sensing: AV is equipped with a variety of sensors to sense
the physical environment and detect collisions.
• Decision: AV has a number of navigation-related control
functions that allow Level-5 autonomy, i.e., it requires
real-time updating of travel routes, enables intelligent
route planning and automatic steering in accordance with
road conditions.
• Decision: AV has a number of safety-related control
functions that allow Level-5 autonomy, i.e., it enables
automatic steering, speed regulation and braking in ac-
cordance with road conditions.
B. Security Objectives and Requirements of AV
Based on this operation model, we identify the basic secu-
rity objectives of an AV as follows:
• Integrity of remote control functions of the AV (possibly
as an emergency operation from the traffic management
system) so that no attacker is able to take over control of
the AV by tampering the remote control system.
• Integrity of the sensor systems so that navigation and
safety related control features will not be interfered by
attackers through tampering the sensor data.
• Integrity of the safety-related control operations such as
braking and speed control are performed in accordance
with the sensed road conditions or from remote control
instructions.
• Integrity of the navigation-related control operations such
as steering, braking and speed control are performed in
accordance with the sensed road conditions or from pre-
programming route path.
• Confidentiality of communications between AV and traf-
fic management system so that safety-related control
parameters will not be disclosed to unauthorized parties
who may potential develop further exploits to the AV.
• Confidentiality and integrity of communications between
AV and its manufacturer so that robustness of the life
cycle management and maintenance of the AV can be
assured.
• Integrity and authenticity of communications between AV
and maintenance workshop so that software patches and
updates to the AV can be performed with high assurance.
• Confidentiality of cryptographic keying materials stored
inside the AV are ensured so that attackers cannot by-
pass higher level security mechanisms by siphoning the
cryptographic keys.
C. Safety Standards for AV
AV should be modeled as a socio-technical system where
safety is of utmost importance because human lives are at
stake. For AV, safety-criticality directly leads to the criticality
of cybersecurity, and not the other way around. Hence, the AV
security objectives are to be based on, and derived from, the
relevant AV safety standards. The current safety standards for
AV are presented in the following.
• ISO 26262 [6]: This standard is derived from IEC
61508 [5], which was developed for all electri-
cal/electronic safety-related systems. ISO 26262 is specif-
ically targeted for automotive safety. This standard pro-
vides a safety lifecycle throughout the phases like man-
agement, development, production, operation, service,
and decommissioning. ISO 26262 also defines the Au-
tomotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL). ASIL includes
Severity classification (S0 – S3), Exposure classification
(E0 – E4) and Controllability classification (C0 – C3)
to quantify the severity of an injury, probability of oc-
currence and controllability of the situation, respectively.
ASIL is expressed as follows.
ASIL = Severity × Exposure× Controllability
where the higher level of ASIL indicates a more grievous
situation. In the context of AV, it can be noted that
the controllability level is extremely high for level 3
upwards. To assess the ASIL, one can adopt techniques
such as, Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA),
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA).
• SAE J3061[1]: Recognising the specific need for a
standard in the wake of cyber security incidents for
automotive, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
decided to move together with ISO to define the standard
J3061. While it is based on the ISO 26262, it identifies
the growing threat landscape and tries to establish the
awareness and a common terminology across the AV
supply chain. It establishes the terminology of threat
(malicious attacker), vulnerability (unguarded gateway)
and risk (likelihood of attack). Most importantly, J3061
delineates the scope of cybersecurity by stating that –
cybersecurity-critical system are not necessarily safety-
critical, however, the reverse is true. It also emphasizes
the distinction between system safety (fault/accident) and
system cybersecurity (purposeful attack).
Figure 6 illustrates our approach for analyzing and identify-
ing the AV security objectives and requirements on the basis
of the relevant AV safety and security policies and standards.
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Fig. 6. AV Security Design Flow
D. Adversarial Models for AV Security
Given the security objectives and requirements as well as the
system security model for AV, we now consider the assumed
capabilities of the attacks; that is the adversarial models for
AV security. As discussed, the purpose of this effort is to
estimate the capabilities of the adversaries so that control
features can be designed to commensurate with the sensitivity
of the system and the risks it is exposed to. The following
adversarial capabilities are defined for AV, which are applied
for the security analysis for this manuscript.
Property 1. An adversary is capable of intercepting and tam-
pering all inter-vehicle and intra-vehicle communication.
Property 2. An adversary is capable of introducing malicious
nodes in the inter-vehicle and intra-vehicle communica-
tion network.
These adversarial models are practical and have been
demonstrated in the context of several attacks.
E. System Security Model for AV
Though the aforementioned standards can act as the guide-
lines to begin with, yet there is a lack of consistency in the
approaches for identifying attack surfaces, threat identification
and risk assessment. Consequently, there is no single standard
applicable to the AV security as a CPS given its complex
overlap across multiple technology domains like wireless com-
munication, electronics [6], mechanical systems and software
development practices [7].
Figure 7 presents a high-level model for security-by-design
of AV. In this model, we define the attack surfaces of the
AV into three layers: (1) the core layer which is defined by
the physical enclosure of the AV; (2) the interface layer, or
AV gateway layer, which is characterised by the collection
of connectivity interfaces between the AV and the external
world; (3) the infrastructure layer which is composed of all the
infrastructure and backend modules which are trusted by and
connected to the AV. The security issues are clearly distributed
over these three layers, first, the AV system; second, the AV
gateway and third, the V2V/V2I communications.
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Motor,	CAN,	FlexRay	
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Fig. 7. AV Security by Design
The core layer, being defined by the physical enclosure of
the AV, enforces its perimeter through physical security. The
AV gateway layer consists of diverse forms of communication
links, including Bluetooth, WiFi, ZigBee that helps establish
and maintain communication with external vehicles and in-
frastructures. This layer defines a network security perimeter,
which is enforced by network access control mechanisms to
guard against unauthorized access to the internal functional-
ities of the AV. This layer relies on the assumed physical
security of the core layer so that any damage done to this
vehicle within this layer through physical means are not
considered an AV security hazard due to cyber attacks.
The outermost layer includes all external systems that
are interacting with the AV, which includes vehicles, traffic
infrastructures and cloud-based navigation service provider,
for example. Note that, not all of these external systems could
be upfront categorized as a trusted party. Therefore, a dynamic
trust management approach has to be undertaken at this layer.
A threat arises when a trusted component communicates
malicious packets (e.g., malware during software update) or
when an untrusted component is able to bypass the secure
gateway (e.g., by compromising the vehicle sim card). Note
that, the AV system is not necessarily falling prey to an
attacker if the security perimeter is breached. For example,
Audi A8 maintains a network layout [30], where the wireless
infrastructure is kept away from the internal AV network via a
secure gateway. Thus, a cybersecurity incident may occur but,
safety will not be compromised provided the safety related
features are not accessible from the wireless gateway.
V. AV SECURITY: IMPLEMENTATION, OPERATION AND
MANAGEMENT
Typically, the design of security controls starts with the
establishment of a security perimeter, followed by a root-of-
trust (ROT) definition, and the design of trust infrastructure
providing the basis for trust management discussed in the
following subsections V-A and V-B, respectively. This works
towards achieving the security objective based on the AV
system security model (section IV-E). Note that, the security
objectives are derived from the safety objective, via TVR
analysis and the study of adversarial models.
On the basis of the threat environments due to these perime-
ter and ROT definitions, we can identify potential security vul-
nerabilities of AV and, through the identified attack surfaces,
can design the corresponding countermeasures. These counter-
measures will be included in the secure AV design framework.
We also suggest how these threats/countermeasures could be
used as the parameters for AV security testing/auditing in
connection to the cybersecurity analysis techniques.
A. Security Perimeter
The purpose of security perimeter is essentially to divide
the AV into segregated security domains with different threat
environments. This segregation will have direct impact on the
validity of the trust model, hence the design of the underlying
trust infrastructure as well as the security mechanisms. By
establishing and accepting a security perimeter, AV design can
simplify the distinction between cybersecurity incidents and
physical tampering.
More importantly, the use of security perimeter allows
a holistic and systematic approach to security analysis and
design for AV. The banking industry, for example, has accumu-
lated vast experiences in the adoption of security perimeter and
defence-in-depth in managing security risks in an organized
and controlled manner, when their banking systems interface
with the open and hostile Cyberspace, in order to provide
Internet banking services.
The three layers defined in IV-E serves as a sound basis for
defining the security perimeters for AV. A well-designed se-
curity architecture for AV should implement sufficient control
mechanisms to reinforce the boundary of each layers so that
realistic security assumptions can be made in order to allow
systematic security analysis and design for the layers above it.
To illustrate the importance of the notion of security perime-
ter in AV, we particularly note that a few related literature
emphasizes the sensor spoofing attack as a potential threat to
AV. In our model defined in IV-E, this will not be considered a
relevant or applicable threat, because the sensors are embedded
within security perimeter of the core layer. Without open
network distribution of the sensors, any attempt to spoof the
sensors will require physical intrusion of the AV, e.g., an
attacker may simply damage the rearview camera, thus not
considered a cyber attack. On the other hand, a threat is
recognized cyber attacks only if it is due to compromises of
the network access control mechanisms at the AV gateway
layer or tampered messages from a trusted, but compromised,
component.
B. Establishing Roots of Trust
In order to maintain trusted communications with other
CPS/IoT devices internal and external to the AV, the ROT
must be established. The ROT will serve as the basis for
secure key exchange and for key management. Traditionally,
a trusted third party (TTP) may be established to enable key
exchange and entity authentication. The TTP will plays the
role of assuring the association of a cryptographic key with
the truthful identity of the key owner. Besides, the AV is also
assumed to have a secure environment for storing the secret
cryptographic key.
In general, though some tamper-resistant hardware may
be deployed for storing cryptographic keys in a physically
protected environment, the association between the key and
the device identity remains a security challenge. More recently,
due to the cost and operational overheads of deploying and ad-
ministering remote devices such as IoT sensors and actuators,
the use of Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) has attracted
the attention of IoT security researchers. In essence, PUF
allows the device identity to be established directly from the
silicon characteristics of the device itself, hence alleviating the
device identity adminustration problem which is fundamental
to trust management. Hence, ROT can be achieved by either a
PUF-based digital authentication and signature generation; or a
public-key protocol to share the key; or having pre-distributed
set of keys.
Trusted Infrastructure: A trusted infrastructure can be
agreed upon during the AV manufacturing, and during the
AV life cycle. The AV design house needs to provide regular
support to the end users, for secure software patch, for secure
boot and prevention of theft. This can be achieved by marking
certain parties as trusted. The smart phone industry is a promi-
nent example where a number of comprehensive PKI-based
trusted infrastructure have been established for enabling device
lifecycle management, system software upgrade, application
software update as well as for prevention of device theft.
Furthermore, in this context, AV design can be further
secured by ensuring a secure supply-chain management, which
is also a common and recurring theme in the supply chain of
Integrated Circuits (IC). Specifically, the planting of Trojan
hardware in the AV is a major threat to take into account.
Trust Management: For V2V/V2I interaction in a given
AV environment, the notion of trust has to be rigourously
maintained and the level of trust be dynamically established.
For example, V2V communication should be based on a
suitable level of trust among the communicating vehicles.
Without this, the V2V communication should not be used for
supporting critical operations such as safety-related functions
in that any malicious (or compromised) participants in the
V2V communication will immediately expose a cluster of AVs
to a chain-reaction of attacks. Accordingly, the trust in the AV
network has to be managed dynamically. On the other hand,
for in-vehicle software update, the patch must be obtained
from a trusted source. Though such trusted communication
may be established on a need-to basis, the notion of trust must
be built on some established ROT.
C. Security of Safety Operations
We now discuss, through exemplary safety scenarios
(specifically collision avoidance and navigation), how some of
the key security objectives defined in IV-B can be achieved.
For all the example cases we assume the following RoT and
security perimeter.
• Root-of-Trust: RoT in this scenario includes naviga-
tion service provider, which updates and assists on the
static/dynamic obstacles in the route of the AV. Fur-
thermore, the integrity of the safety/navigation control
components need to be ensured.
• Security Perimeter: We assume it to be AV gateway and
the trusted traffic infrastructure for providing navigational
services. This security perimeter can be achieved by
establishing a secure gateway for the navigation service
provider as well as verifying integrity of the commands.
For the security of safety operations, we exemplify the
principles through few following practical scenarios.
1) Collision Avoidance: The attacker is able to force the AV
into collision with another dynamic object (AV, pedestrian) or
a static object (road sign).
Security-by-Design: While collision avoidance for AV is a
recent concern that requires delving into legal complications
apart from the technical challenges, this is a well explored
topic in the context of vessel [33] and aircraft navigation [34].
Similar techniques with precise location update and identifi-
cation of surrounding objects can ensure that the AV does
not collide due to its own failure. However, from the safety
angle, the AV should have a high assurance mechanism for
independently detecting collision, which will have a over-
writing privilege to stop the vehicle gracefully in the event
that imminent collision is detected. To achieve this, efficient,
real-time embedded obstacle sensors will be desirable, since
the assurance of such kill switch mechanism is difficult to
attain if it is implemented in software. Worse yet, human lives
will be at stake if the collision detection mechanism is based
on some AI or analytic techniques whose results tend to be
probabilistic.
Here, one can ensure collision avoidance by designing an
efficient, real-time, embedded obstacle sensor-actuator system.
The objective of this system will be to override the car
safety/navigation switches and to brake the car and stop the
engine, immediately upon the detection of an obstacle that
might result in a collision.
To aid this system, the security objective is to ensure -
integrity of safety and navigation related control operations.
The specific security measures required are as following.
• Integrity of the sensor systems so that navigation and
safety related control features will not be interfered by
attackers through tampering the sensor data.
• Integrity of the safety-related control operations such as
braking and speed control are performed in accordance
with the sensed road conditions or from remote control
instructions.
• Integrity of the navigation-related control operations such
as steering, braking and speed control are performed in
accordance with the sensed road conditions or from pre-
programming route path.
• Confidentiality of cryptographic keying materials stored
inside the AV are ensured so that attackers cannot by-
pass higher level security mechanisms by siphoning the
cryptographic keys.
• Integrity of the kill switch that forces the AV to
brake/steer in presence of an unavoidable obstacle, over-
riding other AV mechanism.
2) Navigation: The attacker is capable of mounting an
attack through the interface used by a third-party navigation
service provider.
Security-by-Design: The attacker is able to penetrate the
internal network of the AV and thus, get access to unprotected
components, which are sensitive to the safety and security
of the AV. This can be done by either breach-of-trust (by
the navigation service provider), or by the software/hardware
interface responsible for receiving navigation inputs, such as
GPS receivers.
Note that, in this attack, the RoT assumption is violated
since, we do not necessarily assume the navigation service
provider as a trusted party anymore. Here, one can ensure
robust navigation by designing a supplementary GPS system.
The objective of this system will be to provide the car a sense
of its own position, thus reducing singular dependency on the
third party service providers.
To aid this system, the security objective is to ensure -
integrity of navigation related control operations. The specific
security measures required are essentially same as the ones for
collision avoidance. Furthermore, one needs to adopt a spoof
identification mechanism/supply an independent GPS system.
3) Remote Control: The attacker is able to achieve control
of the car network through a remote control component.
Consequently, she/he is capable of taking over the cruise/brake
control of the AV, which enables her/him to completely disrupt
the journey of the AV.
Security-by-Design: Here, unlike the navigation system,
the attacker looks into the remote control access mecha-
nism and uses those gateways for gaining access to the
car network. Once the car is accessible, multiple attacks
can be mounted, if the AV does not have proper in-
tegrity/authenticity/confidentiality checks in place for an in-
truder. For a remote keyless entry, it is possible to apply some
variant of a replay attack, which records the code (typically
from an RF transmitter), and later resends to gain entry to the
vehicle.
Note that this attack violates the security perimeter and
gain access to the car. To prevent such scenario, the AV can
have an onboard IoT communication monitor. This device will
maintain all sorts of IoT communications that’s related to this
particular AV. The device can flag a warning when a set of
unusual activities are recorded. The specific security measures
required are as following.
• Integrity of remote control functions of the AV, e.g.,
through biometric identification and/or two-factor authen-
tication.
• Integrity of the safety-related control operations such as
braking and speed control are performed in accordance
TABLE II
AV SECURITY-BY-DESIGN
Safety RoT Security Security ObjectiveObjective Perimeter Integrity Confidentiality
Collision Avoidance Trusted Third Parties AV Gateway Sensor, Navigation-system,
Key Management
Key Management Kill Switch
Navigation Key Management Safety-system Sensor, Navigation-system,GPS Spoof Detection
Remote Control Trusted Third Parties AV Gateway Authentication ofKey Management Remote Control
with the sensed road conditions or from remote control
instructions.
• Confidentiality of cryptographic keying materials stored
inside the AV are ensured so that attackers cannot by-
pass higher level security mechanisms by siphoning the
cryptographic keys.
D. AV Security Management
While the security-by-design principles attempt to minimize
the security risks in a systematic manner, security management
for AV is necessary for continuous assessment of the security
challenges during the entire lifetime of an AV. To that effect,
we discuss the threat analysis and risk assessment, security
testing techniques and legal perspectives of AV security inci-
dents in the following.
Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA): Since the
standards outlined earlier only help in assigning a quan-
tification under a common assumption of threats, risks and
vulnerability – it is important to assess these factors and
undertake a rigorous cybersecurity testing, possibly in an
automated manner. It should be noted that the Threat Analysis
and Risk Assessment (TARA) is specified as part of SAE
J3061, which, however, leaves the determination of the risk
level and choice of TARA method to the specific organisation.
To that end, there are few prominent methods listed below, for
which a detailed review can be found here [28].
• Attack Tree Analysis: A standard method is to base on the
Attack Trees, as done for the EVITA Threat and Oper-
ability (THROP) analysis [28]. From a functional/feature
point of view, the threat is analysed using the attack trees.
Further, with the combination of potential threats, the
worst-case scenario is identified and the risk is quantified.
The severity classification in EVITA is distributed across
safety, privacy, financial and operational verticals.
• TVRA: TVRA is a standard approach for Threat, Vulner-
ability and Risk Assessment for CPS, where the threat
is associated with the assets in the system. This was
developed for data- and telecommunication applications.
• Software Vulnerability Analysis [25]: This is a technique
for assessing the vulnerability of a software code. The
idea of software vulnerability stems from the fact that
the development and actual environment of a software
implementation can differ drastically, more so for AV-like
resource-constrained environment and under the influence
of a malicious attacker.
Apart from the above ones, there are further threat analysis
approaches based on the STRIDE framework [4], where, first
the threat level is determined, followed by the impact level
and eventually, the security level.
Security Testing Methods:
• Penetration Testing: Penetration testing is commonly per-
formed as part of a security audit, under the setting of
a “black box” or a “white box” test subject. In a black
box setting, the system details are unknown to the tester,
whereas in the white box setting, a powerful adversary
is assumed and the system internals are provided to the
attacker. The goal of the penetration testing to identify
the vulnerabilities and assess the system security.
• Red Teaming: This is a process for detecting network and
system vulnerabilities by assuming the role of an attacker,
also alternatively termed as ethical hacking.
• Fuzz Testing: In fuzz testing, huge amount of random data
is input to the software/system in an attempt to make
it crash. The goal is to test coding error and security
loopholes.
• Network Testing: In this test, the network resilience is
tested by passing large number of packets in short bursts.
Further to the stress test, the network configuration and
the malicious activities, if any, are tested by performing
packet decoding and matching network topology.
Given the diverse kinds of TARA approaches and security
testing techniques for secure system design, it is necessary to
define and adopt an appropriate methodology for AV security
management, especially considering both the OT aspects (re-
pairing/servicing) as well as the IT aspects (software update,
malicious nodes).
VI. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Security of AV is an important issue and should be con-
sidered in a systematic and holistic manner. In this paper, we
argued that the security-by-design principle for AV is poorly
understood and rarely practiced. We addressed the issue by
modeling an AV as a cyber-physical system and studied the
AV security objectives by viewing from the perspective of
a socio-technical framework. This was done methodically by
developing a security-by-design framework for AV from the
first principle.
We derived the security objectives and the necessary control
measures from the perspective of safety requirements of AV.
We argued that one of the key objectives of cybersecurity of
AV is to ensure that safety operations are resilience in the
face of cyber attacks. Subsequently, the technical challenges
and the proposed approaches for AV security were identified
and discussed.
Nevertheless, apart from safety assurance, in order for AV
to be adopted as a preferred means for transport, the legal
and liability issues behind AV remain a major challenge. In
essence, technical designs and control measures should be
developed to enable law-enforcement agencies and judicial
officers to determine the liabilities and the parties at fault in the
unfortunate situation of car crashes which could possibly lead
to loss of lives. The legal and liabilities issues are important
problems that should be addressed as part of the future studies
of AV security.
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